Figures related to
construction of tunnels
Submitted by “American
number One”
We have just over one
thousand, four hundred yards of underground facilities dug out as of
the beginning of October 1916. This does not include living quarters,
storage spaces or above ground conditions such as trenches. They will
be added to this document at a later point in order to complete the
estimations of which I am compiling now.
First it must be said that
the military unit(s) which are responsible for the current projects
have done their utmost to maintain all existing structures while
improving them to more acceptable levels for the kind of duties they
have been tasked to do while attempting to keep up with an ever
changing and aggressive set of new projects delivered to them. The
men involved have been worked beyond their recommended levels in the
face of little or no proper reinforcement of troops trained in our
present tactics and tools. Despite weekly requests for this to change
we have only received token troop additions who were largely wiped
out or badly wounded in the great battle which took place only a
short time ago. At present I believe we are at or below half strength
in terms of expected man power and well below what we actually need
to be an effective unit for our task while expected to maintain
combat readiness for above ground operations The fact we were
issued Chinese laborers speaks a great deal to the facts I am going
to present here for your to read, and if they are representative of
their people I should like to you send me all of the Chinese you can
as they are the hardest working people I've ever seen. Which is no
discredit to the British troops, but most of them are not miners, and
fewer still are soldiers by trade which makes them less than ideal
for underground construction and soldiering.
It is my belief that we
need one soldier in the trenches every five yards, replaced every
eight hours. And underground I must have without fail a minimum of
sixty men for sentry duties and listening posts, on every occasion
we have been short men and supplies to do this and the German's have
exploited it with an alarming degree of ability. On the occasions
when we were fully manned and the German's attacked the battles were
hard fought to a point of nearly mutual losses. The use of what you English call “unsanctioned or personal firearms” has always been
the factor which tipped victory in the favor of our little outpost.
But since these weapons are purchased by the soldier out of pocket and
shipped at great expense from my home country ( the United States of
America) it is extremely time consuming to gain additional supplies,
parts or god forbid ammunition. Also the massive increase in the
number of hand guns; now being issued to all men underground while on
duty has played a critical role in keeping the Hun from breaking
through when they had surprise and numbers in their favor. However
the continual lack of reliable supplies for ammunition despite our
purchasing American guns in English calibers has become an issue for
those who are charged with holding at all costs; or blowing their
tunnels with explosives. The demolition of a tunnel is a constant
threat to us as they are slow and expensive to construct, once blown
we have lost the initiative and there is a risk the Germans will
exploit our lost ground and expand their operations in the area. We
also cannot remove our own men from the tunnel once it is declared
“over run”. No matter how this is seen in terms of man power loss
the impact it has on the moral of men in the unit when they are
ordered to blow up a passage way filled by Germans and their own
friends in this unit has a profound impact upon their work in the
weeks which follow. Recently we suffered several situations in which
tunnels were required to be blown up, or where men charged into them
hoping to hold back attackers, and only two of the men have survived
each of these; myself being one.
I am constantly reminded
whenever I submitted reports that this is a war, also I am informed
that my requests seem overly generous in their quantities and
materials for the tasks which our unit has been given to complete.
This is a remarkable thing to be told, at no point have I observed
what I would term a war. Not a proper war atleast, in America when we
go to war each man is issued a weapon for his task and equipment to
carry it out. When men decide to carry their own weapons it is seen
as a sign of supreme capablity that he has given up the weapon issued
to him in favor of one which he will have exceptional skills in
using. This frees up the rifle he was isued for some other soul who
did not own his own fire arms.
When an American carries
his personal weapons he can walk into the Quarter Master's and show
the weapon, then get the supplies he needs. There isn't any question
about why some private carries a pistol and a shot gun, he has it
because he needed it. If he asks for a shovel or a blanket no one
feels the need to ask him to fill out paperwork for being without
something he “might have been issued” at some point.
If a general in the United
States were told to take and hold a position, he would look at the
situation and then consult his under officer's. They would see who
among their serving men were qualified to judge the situation locally
and from there a plan is developed which will maximize the
effectiveness of the troops at hand. The General would present the
mission, the under officers would take up their tasks and local men
are allowed to fight how / where on the field they are best able to
do so.
In England's army: Someone
( I don't know who) forms a plan which works as follows,
1 Take less than half as
many men as you might think are needed to do a job, prepare the enemy
for days or months with repeated and formulaic attacks so identical
as to render dates on orders completely needless.
2 Refuse to supply the
troops at hand with any/all supplies they are screaming for on a
daily basis and then tell them hours before hand it's their turn to
climb over the walls.
3 Wait for the reports to
come back of another failed series of attacks and countless thousands
of good young lads killed for no reason at all.
Troops are sent over the
wall regardless of their skill sets, cavalry units are deployed to
trenches and engineers are ordered out of their positions to fill the
holes in the infantry. The infantry are sent to make wave after wave
of suicidal attacks. I have seen cooks and medics firing weapons
picked up off of dead soldiers because there weren't enough trained
men left to defend a position. I have seen Chinese men fend off
Germany's best infantry units with nothing more than lengths of wood
and hand tools. The cost to our man power is high and the loss of
time is becoming very critical in nature, the materials lost are slow
to be replaced on top of everything else.
If our mission is to be
successful we need to be allowed to pursue the single task for which
the unit was created and to which we are greatly desirous to
complete. This unit needs to be removed from the roles of “Infantry”
and seen as little more than extra troops to fill in the holes after
another disaster takes the limited men present and throws them away.
We cannot remain effective
while our forces are split between the task we have and serving as
back up soldiers. We will not be able to complete the mission on time
if we do not receive rapid replenishment of soldiers and laborers
and qualified persons for mission specific skilled positions.
I have completed and
submitted before lists of men I feel are very important to completing
the projects with which we have been assigned, I will do it again for
the sake of making a complete report of all things needed.
Now back to the reason
we're all here, or why I'm here and what you can do to help me get
out of this stinking hole while you declare victory or whatever it is
you'll do when this is all over. These numbers I am about to give are
absolute minimums we require. If less is provided it will result in
delays or a complete shut down of projects. This mission cannot not
be completed without required materials and timely deliveries, the
team will not attempt to make do with insufficient or unacceptable
substitutions as that would only cause tragic failures from which
there would be no recovery.
I am providing a sample of
existing material requirements per Ten Meter lengths, for the ease or
the reader I am treating Meters / Yards as identical units of
measure. However we know the difference actually and the exact
figures are available in my office for MOD records after the war if
they so desire.
20 8in x8in x10ft Beams
(Primary supports)
36 2in x6in x10ft boards, (
the Roof )
36 2in x4in x10ft boards
(cross braces )
These are the absolute min
required to hold a tunnel up. Following are other materials which are
essensial to maintaining our current project's viability and the
unit's best possible progress.
33ft electrical wire for
lights
2 light sockets
3 sections of 10ft long, 1in
Outside diameter pipe. ( to pump clean air into tunnels)
3 sections of 10ft long, 1in
Outside diameter pipe. ( to protect telephone and electric cables)
3 sections of 10ft long, 4in
Outside diameter pipe. ( For removal of the water )
3 ( 55gal) steel drums, sunk
into the floors to act as sumps for water removal.
300 square feet of “Chicken
/ pig / chain link” fencing to help keep sand bags upright on
walls.
All of his weighs about one
and a half tons, now to complete all our tunnels to acceptable levels
multiply this by One Hundred and Forty Two times. According to
common estimations I have from the work done and the regular work
loads. This does not include the special project for which I will
provide a separate document explaining it's requirements and time
table.
The goods and materials
which I have been given to use thus far are nearly spent in most
cases and will require replacement in order to maintain our current
pace of construction. It is also worth noting that while our
detractors have claimed we do not “need” the quantities of
materials we ask for it was those materials on hand which allowed us
to replace all sections damaged by the German attack.
I am now at a stage where
we can begin our glorious task, provided that I have the man power
and the materials delivered regularly. It will not be enough to
simply have more man power than I need, nor will an excess of
materials and insufficient man power. I must have both in the
required amounts on time or we are lost. If I have an excess of
materials, they will be lost at the depot (stolen), or we will have
no where to keep them safe and secure underground when they arrive.
If I am required to leave them on he surface they become a target for
German artillery, while the Kaiser's intelligence service will
doubtless begin to piece together what it is I am trying to do here.
And of course materials will go missing (more theft). If the German
can see what is going on, he will reproduce it and attempt to beat us
at our own games. For the record, the German is exceedingly good at
this and if it were not for some good old “American Know how” I
am sure this whole section would be another unfortunate page in
military history.
While we are talking about
the Americans, I have noticed there is an unofficial segratation
among the officers, the none commissioned officers and the enlisted
men which goes beyond the simple chain of command. There are units
here from entire villages, counties and so on. When a military unit
is wiped out you have lost dozens of men and boys from a single
community, in addition to your decimation of localized youth it means
that the units are extremely insular in nature. A new arrival is
treated like someone who's wandered into the wrong apartment during a
holiday, they are rarely welcomed by the old hands and are often
given the worst possible positions that the unit has to take up.
These situations are
extremely detramentle to the efficiency of units which are in mortal
danger of extinction should they fail to gain and accept new members.
Our own unit is now overwhelmingly non-English to a point that only
the officers remain as the English born. Nearly all the enlisted men
are either Americans or from distant colonies but lack their own
leadership and as a result we have break downs in communication between officers born and raised to a cultural norm of military
service which the non-English men frequently cannot understand and
will be unable or unwilling to follow. It is not enough to simply
tell men to throw away their lives “For King and Country”, most
of these men have never seen the King, they do not benefit from the
Grand Empire, and are here largely from the stories of adventure and
glory or in some cases conscription. The idea that everyman is ready
to die for the King and the Empire is entirely false, they want to
live every single man. The idea you might need to die is one they
resign themselves to, but do not seek or hope for.
When the officer's try to
bolster them with stories of glorious death it only serves to cause
men too closely acquainted with a situation's terrible truth to form
discontent and resentment. Soon after will follow subversion or
disregard for orders which they feel to be unreasonable and then
outright mutiny. I have only met the French army a few times but many
know they march to their certain deaths for no gain at all. If there
was a way out, I know they ( individuals) will soon take it, if the
French have defections, surrenders or mutiny the Colonial soldiers
and finally the English farm boys will soon follow and that's all
there is to it.
On the subject of man
power, other than the sixty men per shift I'd need to staff the
listening posts and serve as security in the tunnels ( a total of
roughly one hundred and twenty men total). We will need about two
hundred additional men for underground duties with a hope to have a
total of three hundred infantry total. We will also need proportional
increases in support persons and logistics which upto now have been
handled almost entirely in an organic manor. If all of these units
can be supplied within a fortnight I can have them working on the
primary and secondary mission parameters by the the second week of
their arrival. And will still possibly make the six months or less
timeline. I cannot however stress enough the need for nearly complete
autonomy and the need to maintain a steady stream of supplies
throughout the course of our actions here.